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I Click, You Click, We all Click . . .
But Do We Have a Contract?:
A Case Comment on Aspencerl.com v. Paysystems
Charles Morgan†
This contract was last updated December 18, 2003.It is trite to say that e-commerce has exploded over
Please click here to review.the last several years. Canadian individuals and busi-
nesses are entering into thousands and thousands of con- The Court had to determine whether it had juris-
tracts online all the time. Yet, oddly enough, there is diction to hear the dispute, given the presence of the
surprisingly little legal certainty or consistency regarding arbitration clause. In order to decide the matter, the
an essential legal question: what approach to online con- Court first had to decide whether the online unilateral
tract formation will create a binding legal contract? Such amendment was enforceable.
legal uncertainty is unfortunate, since buyers need to Pursuant to a legal analysis discussed below, theknow when to ‘‘beware’’, merchants need to be able to Court held that Aspencerl.com Inc.’s mere use of themanage risk, and courts need to have clear guidelines in Paysystems Corp. Web site following the posting of theorder to be able to render informed, coherent decisions. amendment and the above notice was insufficient to
The issue of online contract formation was recently establish binding consent to the posted amendments.
treated in the Quebec court decision Aspencerl.com v. Therefore, the arbitration clause that was contained in
Paysystems Corporation1 (Paysystems). The legal argu- the said amendments was unenforceable.
ment in the decision differs significantly from existing
Canadian and Quebec jurisprudence on the subject of
online contract formation. Accordingly, this case com- Summary ment is intended to analyse and critique the Paysystems
decision, to discuss and evaluate current approaches to uebec jurisprudence on the subject of online con-
online contract formation more generally, and to pro- Q tract formation is rare and the conclusions of such
vide advice regarding how to mitigate the risk of a cases are broadly divergent. Under the circumstances, it
finding of non-enforceability. is difficult to obtain legal certainty as regards the applica-
tion of Article 1385 of the Civil Code of Quebec to
online contract formation. Pursuant to the analysis
below, I am of the opinion that the Court’s reasoning inThe Paysystems Decision 
the Paysystems decision contains a number of significant
n January 31, 2005, the Cour du Québec rendered errors of law that suggest that the case is unlikely to beO a decision in Paysystems that treated the issue of followed or, if followed, that its reasoning will be subject
the enforceability of an amendment to a paper-based to significant critique. The fact that the decision was
contract. The case involved a dispute in relation to a rendered by the Cour du Québec will also limit its sig-
hosting and services agreement between Paysystems Cor- nificance as a precedent.
poration and Aspencerl.com Inc. The two parties entered
The key to ensuring a binding online contract is tointo the agreement in 2002. The original agreement did
establish a direct correspondence between the offer andnot contain an arbitration clause. On October 23, 2003,
what is accepted, as well as a manifestation of the will ofPaysystems Corporation unilaterally amended the orig-
a person to accept an offer to contract. Such manifesta-inal contract and added an exclusive arbitration clause,
tion may be express or tacit.made available via hyperlink and subject to the fol-
Where an individual is presented with contractuallowing online notice on the opening screen of the
terms in an electronic or paper environment and thePaysystems Web site:
individual writes or states or clicks ‘‘I agree’’, the indi-Your continued use of My Paysystems Services is subject to
the current version of the My Paysystems Contract. vidual is expressly manifesting his or her consent to the
†© Charles Morgan, a partner in the Technology Law Group of McCarthy Tétrault LLP in Montréal. The author wishes to acknowledge the research
assistance of Valérie Lemieux, associate in the Technology Law group of McCarthy Tétrault LLP in Montréal. The opinions expressed in this case comment, as
well as any errors that may appear herein, are the author’s alone.
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110 Canadian Journal of Law and Technology
Acceptance which does not correspond substantially to theterms of the offer. Moreover, based on the jurisprudence
offer or which is received by the offeror after the offer hascited below, tacit manifestation of consent may be estab-
lapsed does not constitute acceptance. It may, however, con-lished where the offeree performs a ‘‘positive gesture’’ stitute a new offer.
that unequivocally demonstrates an intention to accept
Article 1394 of the CCQ states:the offer.
Silence does not imply acceptance of an offer, subject only
Finally, in my conclusions and recommendations at to the will of the parties, the law or special circumstances,
the end of this case comment, I discuss various such as usage or a prior business relationship.
approaches to online contract formation and the most Finally, according to Article 1387 of the CCQ:
effective means of mitigating the risk of a court finding
A contract is formed when and where acceptance is receivedthat the approach adopted will be held to be unenforce- by the offeror, regardless of the method of communication
able. used, and even though the parties have agreed to reserve
agreement as to secondary terms.
Legislative Framework The language of these provisions is technologically
neutral. The key to ensuring a binding online contract is
to establish a direct correspondence between the offerTechnological Neutrality 
and what is accepted, as well as a manifestation of theThe Quebec Act to establish a legal framework for
will of a person to accept an offer to contract. Suchinformation technology2 (the ‘‘Quebec Technology Act’’)
manifestation may be express or tacit.enshrines the principle of technological neutrality at sec-
tion 5, which states:
Writing, Signature, and Other Formalities 
The legal value of a document, particularly its capacity to
On the whole, very few types of contracts are sub-produce legal effects and its admissibility as evidence, is
neither increased nor diminished solely because of the ject to formal requirements (such as writing, signature,
medium or technology chosen. disclosure, or delivery requirements) beyond valid offer
and acceptance in order to be enforceable. For example,A similar principle is contained in each of the Uni-
the Quebec Consumer Protection Act (‘‘CPA’’) refers toform Electronic Commerce Act-inspired, common-law
very specific types of contracts that must be evidenced inprovincial e-commerce legislation. For example, the
writing at section 23 (including contracts for credit). 5Ontario Act provides that information or a document to
The CPA sets forth signature requirements at section 27. 6which the Act applies is not invalid or unenforceable by
Neither of these provisions (nor, to my knowledge, anyreason only of being in electronic form.3
other statutory formalism) applies to the contract
In light of this principle, courts should avoid placing described in the Paysystems decision. 7
any greater or lesser burden on parties who wish to
contract in an electronic medium than they would on
Jurisprudence parties who contract orally or on paper.
Quebec Online Contracting Decisions Offer and Acceptance 
Unlike the majority of Uniform Electronic Com-
Paysystems merce Act-inspired e-commerce laws (applicable in the
In Paysystems, the Cour du Québec held that merecommon-law provinces), the Quebec Technology Act
use of a Web site on which a notice was posted woulddoes not contain provisions that specifically address con-
not imply tacit consent to amended contractual termstract formation by electronic means, nor does it address
(also posted on the Web site), particularly where there‘‘electronic agents’’. Instead, the Quebec Technology Act
was uncontested testimonial evidence to the effect thatimplicitly relies on the inherent technological neutrality
the Web site user had not actually taken notice of theof the provisions of the Civil Code of Quebec (‘‘CCQ’’)
amendments. 8related to offer and acceptance.
According to Article 1385 of the CCQ: Although it is possible that the Court’s conclusion is
essentially correct, the Court’s reasoning contains aA contract is formed by the sole exchange of consents
between persons having capacity to contract, unless, in addi- number of errors of law that would suggest that the case
tion, the law requires a particular form to be respected as a is unlikely to be followed without significant critique
necessary condition of its formation, or unless the parties and distinguishing.require the contract to take the form of a solemn agree-
ment. 4 It is also of the essence of a contract that it have a First, the Court suggests that the procedure used by
cause and an object. an Internet-based merchant to establish binding accept-
According to Article 1386 of the CCQ: ance of contractual terms may not involve mere tacit
acquiescence to such terms. 9 However, Article 1386 ofThe exchange of consents is accomplished by the express or
tacit manifestation of the will of a person to accept an offer the CCQ states clearly that the exchange of consents is
to contract made to him by another person. accomplished by the express or tacit manifestation of the
According to Article 1393 of the CCQ: will of a person to accept an offer to contract made to
✄
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I Click, You Click, We All Click . . . But Do We Have a Contract? 111
him by another person. In other words, it is legally erro- its own Web site. The Court found that Sutton’s actions
neous to suggest categorically that tacit acceptance of an likely violated the ‘‘terms of use’’ agreement posted on
Internet-based offer is unenforceable under Quebec law. the mls.ca Web site. The terms were subject to a web-
Instead, each case must be examined on its facts to deter- wrap approach to online contract formation rather than
mine whether or not there is sufficient evidence of tacit a clickwrap approach (i.e., they were posted on the Web
acceptance, based on the actions of the offeree. site and made available via hyperlink, but a visitor to the
Web site was not required to click on an ‘‘I agree’’ iconSecond, the Court, citing doctrine, 10 suggests that
or otherwise expressly manifest consent to the terms).something more than a mere ‘‘click’’ is required in order
The Court granted the injunction nevertheless, holdingto establish binding consent to an electronic contract. 11
that the Canadian Real Estate Association (CREA) had anThe suggestion is oddly contradicted by the Court later
apparent right in the integrity of its Web site, that Suttonin the same decision when it cites with approval the
had violated that right, and that Sutton had, apparently,Rudder v. Microsoft decision (cited by the Court as an
knowingly violated the CREA ‘‘terms of use’’ agreement.example of a decision which is consistent with the rules
While Sutton argued that it was not bound by theof the CCQ in relation to consent). 12 The Rudder deci-
CREA’s ‘‘terms of use’’ because it had not clicked on ansion stands for the proposition that a valid contract may
‘‘I Agree’’ button (or otherwise manifestly indicated itsbe formed using a ‘‘clickwrap’’ approach to contract for-
consent), the Superior Court decided that the issue wasmation (a finding that has been codified in most Cana-
best left to be determined on final judgment. In grantingdian provincial e-commerce laws). In many instances a
the injunction, the Court appeared to be influenced bymere ‘‘click’’ will be sufficient to establish consent (just as
the fact that Sutton ‘‘knew what it was doing’’ and,marking a paper contract with an ‘‘X’’ or saying ‘‘I Agree’’
among other things, found evidence that Sutton knewmay form valid contracts).
that the CREA terms of use applied to it (despite the fact
Third, the Court cites with apparent approval doc- that there was no clickwrap) because Sutton had its own
trine that suggests that ‘‘computer contracts’’ are subject ‘‘terms of use’’ posted using a webwrap approach on its
to a signature requirement. 13 The Court then notes that own Web site.
the amendments were not ‘‘signed’’ by the parties. 14 This
It is not clear whether the Court in Paysystems con-doctrinal and legal assertion is unfounded. As noted
sciously chose not to cite Sutton or whether it wasabove, only a very limited subset of contracts (such as
simply not made aware of the decision. What is clear,those referred to in section 27 of the CPA) are subject to
however, is that the two decisions (Sutton and Paysys-signature requirements to be enforceable.
tems) sit at opposite ends of the spectrum in terms of the
The net result is that the Court holds that (i) tacit guidance they provide to companies and individuals
acceptance of an electronic offer may never be binding; who wish to carry on electronic commerce. Specifically,
(ii) something more than a ‘‘mere’’ click is likely required whereas the Paysystems decision appears to suggest that
to form a binding online contract; and (iii) a signature even a ‘‘clickwrap’’ approach to online contract forma-
may be necessary to establish binding consent to the tion may be insufficient to establish binding consent,
online contract. In my opinion, none of these assertions Sutton suggests that a mere ‘‘webwrap’’ approach to
are accurate. online contract formation may in some instances be
binding. 17 This degree of divergence is unfortunate, as itFinally, the Court’s reasoning suffers from an error
makes it very difficult for merchants and consumers toof omission. Specifically, while the Court cites both the
know in advance what they must do in order to form aOntario Superior Court decision of Rudder and the
binding online contract.Alberta Queen’s Bench decision of North American Sys-
temshops v. King, 15 it fails to cite the two decisions that The analysis below presents an attempt to provide a
are arguably most relevant to the analysis: Kanitz v. reasonable mean between these two extremes.
Rogers Cable Inc. and Canadian Real Estate Association
v. Sutton, both of which are discussed below.
Quebec ‘‘Implicit Consent’’ Decisions 
Sutton The applicable legal analysis to contract formation
Canadian Real Estate Association v. Sutton should be essentially technologically neutral so as to
(Quebec) Real Estate Services Inc. 16 is a rare, recent ensure the functional equivalence and legal value of doc-
example of a Quebec court considering electronic con- uments, regardless of the medium used, and the inter-
tract formation. In that decision, the Quebec Superior changeability of media and technologies, in accordance
Court considered the enforceability of a webwrap agree- with sections 2 and 5 of the Quebec Technology Act.
ment in the context of a request for an interlocutory Below is a summary of some of the leading Quebec
injunction. The Court granted an interlocutory injunc- jurisprudence regarding implicit or tacit consent as a
tion against Sutton, ordering Sutton to cease means of providing guidance regarding the circum-
downloading listings from the <http://www.mls.ca> stances under which implicit or tacit consent to contrac-
Web site for the purpose of reposting the information on tual terms posted online may be inferred.
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Gestion Infopharm Inc. Court, the silence of the party to whom a declaration
regarding the existence of a contract is made does not,In Gestion Infopharm Inc. v. B.C.E. Emergis Inc., 18
generally speaking, imply acceptance of an obligation. Inthe parties were subject to a software license and services
order to consent, it requires a positive gesture. Theagreement with a one-year term. The agreement con-
former principle has been codified at Article 1394 of thetained a fees schedule in relation to programming ser-
CCQ.vices to be performed by Infopharm. The agreement was
tacitly renewed at the end of its initial term. Approxi-
mately two years after the commencement of the con- L. Bucci Estimation Inc. 
tract, Infopharm unilaterally sent a revised fees schedule More recently, in 141517 Canada Inc. v. L. Bucci
to Emergis that significantly increased the applicable ser- Estimation Inc., 21 the Cour du Québec summarized doc-
vice fees. Emergis responded by sending a termination trine and jurisprudence (all Superior Court judgments)
notice. on implicit or tacit consent, by citing the following prin-
One of the principal issues at trial was whether the ciples:
new fees schedule had been accepted by Emergis. On ● Acceptance is tacit when it appears from the cir-
this point, Infopharm argued that by failing to react in cumstances that the party wishes to take advantage
of (‘‘se prévaloir’’) the offer. [translation]any way to the notice of the amended fees schedule
● Implicit consent is demonstrated by the facts andduring a period of five months following receipt of
must not leave any doubt regarding the will andInfopharm’s notice thereof, Emergis had tacitly accepted
the person . . . [translation]the revised contract terms. The Court, noting that
● Although it may be tacit and result from the actsInfopharm continued to apply the terms of the original
and gestures of a party, tacit consent to a contract isfees schedule for four months following notice to not presumed. In the case of a doubt, the doubt
Emergis thereof, rejected Infopharm’s argument. It noted must be interpreted against the formation of a con-
tract. [translation]that Emergis immediately sent the notice of resiliation
following receipt of Infopharm’s first invoice that applied
the new fees. Conclusions 
On the subject of tacit or implicit consent, the Where an individual is presented with contractual
Court held the following: terms in an electronic or paper environment and the
Emergis did not make any positive gesture that would individual writes or states or clicks ‘‘I agree’’, the indi-
have permitted Infopharm to consider that the [revised vidual is expressly manifesting his or her consent to thefees schedule] had been accepted. It is true that acquies-
terms of the offer. Moreover, based on the above-citedcence may be tacit, but it must be unequivocal, which is to
jurisprudence, tacit manifestation of consent may besay that the intention to acquiesce or to waive rights must
be demonstrated or clear. [translation] established where the offeree performs a ‘‘positive ges-
ture’’ that ‘‘unequivocally’’ demonstrates an intention toThe Emergis decision, in the passage cited above,
accept the offer.cites two Supreme Court of Canada decisions, The Mile
End Milling Company v. Peterborough Cereal Com-
pany19 and Grace and Company v. C.E. Perras, 20 summa- Canadian Common Law Online Contracting Deci-
rized below. sions 
Mile End Milling Company 
Rudder 
In Mile End, the dispute involved a contract for the In Rudder v. Microsoft Corp., [1999] O.J. No. 3778shipment of flour. One of the questions before the Court (Ont. Sup. Ct) (‘‘Rudder’’) an Ontario court, in a case ofwas whether one of the parties had waived a contractual first impression in Canada, held that an online member-right by means of acquiescence. The Supreme Court ship agreement became enforceable against a subscriberheld that one should never presume that another has once the subscriber clicked an ‘‘I Agree’’ button. Thewaived a right. While acquiescence may be tacit, it must plaintiffs argued that the member agreement was notbe unequivocal and demonstrated. binding on them because only a portion of the agree-
ment was presented on the screen at one time and
Grace and Company because the term which Microsoft sought to enforce
In Grace and Company, following verbal negotia- against them, an exclusive forum selection clause, was
tions regarding a supply agreement, one party sent a not seen by the plaintiffs before they clicked on the ‘‘I
letter to the other party setting out the said party’s under- Agree’’ button. The plaintiffs contended that the parts of
standing of the terms to which the parties had agreed, the agreement which had to be viewed by scrolling
requesting that the other party confirm. The recipient of throughout the agreement were essentially ‘‘fine print’’
the letter did not respond. The question at trial was and not enforceable against them. The Rudder Court
whether, under the circumstances, such silence implied held the ‘‘clickwrap’’ agreement to be enforceable. It also
acceptance of the terms. According to the Supreme held that the forum selection clause to be binding on the
✄
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I Click, You Click, We All Click . . . But Do We Have a Contract? 113
and users of the service. Among other things, it tells theplaintiffs, even though they had not read that part of the
customers what services Rogers@Home provides as well asagreement.
how these services can and cannot be used. To provide you
The Rudder Court found that although the visitors with the best Internet services possible, we update the EUA
on a periodic basis. Please keep checking back to obtain theto the site claimed not to have read the entire terms and
latest End user Agreement. The EUA was last updatedconditions, they should be deemed to have done so. One
on: January 12th 2001. [The bold appeared in the orig-of the reasons for the decision was the fact that the terms inal.]
and conditions were available for scrolling on the same
Fifth, the fact that the user agreement had beenWeb page as the ‘‘I Agree’’ button. The terms and condi-
amended was noted on the main page of the Customertions were held not be ‘‘fine print’’ for which consumers
Support site in the ‘‘News and Highlights’’ section.might not be held accountable. Pursuant to the Court’s
In summary, according to the Court:reasoning, it would appear that it is not necessary to
The user agreement expressly allows the defendant todemonstrate that visitors actually read the entire terms
amend the user agreement and to give notice of that factand conditions in order for them to be enforceable, but
through its web site. Each of the representative plaintiffsmerely that the visitor had an opportunity to do so and who was originally a customer of the defendant actually
had accepted, by means of a positive gesture, their signed the user agreement which contained this amending
binding nature. provision. Each of the representative plaintiffs who was orig-
inally a Shaw customer also signed a user agreement which
contained an amending provision. The Shaw customersKanitz were given reasonable notice, when they became customers
of the defendant pursuant to the swap, of the terms ofKanitz v. Rogers Cable Inc. 22 (‘‘Kanitz’’), provides
service and other matters relating to the provision of theguidance as to the enforceability of unilateral contract
service by the defendant. It would not be unreasonableamendments that are posted online. In the decision, the to expect that those customers would take the time
defendant moved to stay a proposed class action suit to visit the appropriate sections of the defendant’s
web site to familiarize themselves with the defen-against it on the ground that the agreement between the
dant’s terms of service if they were interested inplaintiffs and the defendant provided for arbitration of
knowing what those terms of service were andall claims (thereby barring court action). The arbitration
whether they differed in any material respect fromclause in the agreement, however, had not been those of Shaw. In my view, therefore, the former Shaw
included in the original hard copy version of the agree- customers became bound by the defendant’s amending pro-
vision once they became customers of the defendant pur-ment sent to all users of the ‘‘Rogers@Home’’ service.
suant to the swap and continued to use the defendant’sRather, Rogers Cable inserted the arbitration clause in
service. 23an amended version of the agreement posted online at
The result of this decision is somewhat controversialRogers’s Web site. The Court concluded that the clause
in that it places a relatively high burden upon a con-was enforceable, and hence, the action was stayed.
sumer to seek out and review the amended terms of anVarious factors led the Court to conclude that the
online contract. It is not clear whether a Quebec courtamended terms of the agreement, posted online, were
would come to a similar conclusion on the facts, since, inenforceable. First, Rogers’s original agreement provided
general, the Quebec consumer protection regime is con-for the possibility of unilateral amendment as follows:
sidered to be particularly consumer friendly in compar-
Amendment. We may change, modify, add or remove por- ison to its common law counterparts. In addition, thetions of this Agreement at any time. We will notify you of
Kanitz decision is perhaps the first Canadian decision toany changes to this Agreement by posting notice of such
uphold the enforceability of a notice and ‘‘webwrap’’changes on the Rogers@Home web site, or sending notice
via email or postal mail. Your continued use of the Service agreement (i.e., where the agreement is available online
following notice of such change means that you agree to via hyperlink and users are deemed to have seen and
and accept the Agreement as amended. If you do not agree consented to the agreement terms) as opposed to ato any modification of this Agreement, you must immedi-
‘‘clickwrap’’ agreement (wherein the user must activelyately stop using Rogers@Home and notify us that you are
demonstrate acceptance of posted terms by means of aterminating this Agreement.
positive gesture such as clicking on an ‘‘I agree’’ icon). 24Second, this amendment clause indicated that
Rogers would provide notice of any future amendments
and indicated the manner in which notice would be North American Systemshops Ltd. 
given. Third, it explicitly indicated that consent to the
Although North American Systemshops Ltd. v.amendment could be established implicitly (i.e., based
King25 is not an online contract formation case, it wason continued use of the service following notice of the
cited with approval in Paysystems and the legal notion ofamendment). Fourth, the online version of the amended
‘‘shrinkwrap’’ software licenses informed the develop-agreement was available via hyperlink beside which the
ment of judicial reasoning in relation to ‘‘clickwrap’’ andfollowing notice was posted:
‘‘webwrap’’ licenses. At issue in the Systemshop case was
End user Agreement. The End user Agreement (EUA) is the enforceability of a software license, the terms ofyour contract with us. In most cases, the EUA was signed
which were printed on the inside back cover of a user’sduring the installation of the Rogers@Home service. It out-
lines the rights and responsibilities of both Rogers@Home manual sold with the software. The plaintiffs in the case
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are likely to proceed to the event page of interest rather thanargued that the prominent presence of a copyright
reading the ‘‘small print.’’ It cannot be said that merelysymbol on the package of the software placed a burden
putting the Terms and Conditions in this fashion necessa-on the defendant to search for the license terms that rily creates a contract with anyone using the website. 29
governed its use. The defendant argued that the sale of
the software without any apparent restrictions on use
Netscape resulted in an implied license to use the software as the
defendant saw fit. The Court sided with the defendant A 2001 decision of a New York court emphasized
holding that the plaintiff had an implied license to use essentially the same principles. In Specht v. Netscape
the purchased software, absent any conspicuous binding Communications Corp. 30 Netscape attempted to enforce
notice of constraints on use. an arbitration clause in an end user license agreement.
The license agreement was allegedly made by NetscapeIt is important to note, however, that in System-
and agreed to by users by downloading computershops, the Court was careful to distinguish the facts in
software known as ‘‘SmartDownload’’ from Netscape’sthe case from the more typical practice of exposing the
Web site. By clicking on a box, visitors initiated the‘‘shrinkwrap’’ license terms directly under the cellophane
downloads. The sole reference to the license agreementwrap used to package the licensed software. In fact,
appeared in text that was visible only if a visitor scrolledAmerican courts have upheld shrinkwrap agreements in
down through the page to the next screen. If the visitora number of cases. 26 Their enforceability has been pre-
did so, he or she saw an invitation to review the licensemised on there being an act by the proposed licensee,
agreement. 31 Visitors were not required affirmatively tonamely removing the cellophane, manifesting assent to
indicate their assent to the license agreement, or even tothe terms of the shrinkwrap license, or indicating an
view the license agreement, before proceeding with aunderstanding that a contract is being formed as a result
download of the software.of action taken by the user.
The New York court refused to enforce the
U.S. Common Law Online Contracting Decisions SmartDownload License Agreement. The Court distin-
guished this form of agreement from both clickwrap and
shrinkwrap licenses, which require users to perform anTicketmaster 
affirmative action unambiguously expressing assent to aA California District Court underscored the
contract. Netscape’s SmartDownload, in contrast,common-law principles that will govern contractual
allowed a user to download and use the softwareenforcement of Web site terms and conditions in the
without taking any action that plainly manifested assentcase of Ticketmaster Corp. v. Tickets.com, Inc. 27 Tick-
to the terms of the associated license or indicating anetmaster claimed, among other things, that rival
understanding that a contract was being formed. Accord-Tickets.com’s practice of deep linking; that is, linking
ingly, the Court refused to find Netscape’s licensedirectly to Web pages within Ticketmaster’s Web site,
enforceable. The Court stated the following:violated the terms and conditions of Ticketmaster’s Web
Netscape argues that the mere act of downloading indicatessite. The judge granted Tickets.com’s motion to dismiss
assent. However, downloading is hardly an unambiguousthe breach of contract claim. Key to the judge’s decision indication of assent. The primary purpose of downloading is
to dismiss the breach of contract claim appeared to be to obtain a product, not to assent to an agreement. In con-
the lack of conspicuousness of the terms and conditions trast, clicking on an icon stating ‘‘I assent’’ has no meaning
or purpose other than to indicate such assent. Netscape’sat issue. The judge noted:
failure to require users of SmartDownload to indicate assentThe home page contains (if a customer scrolls to the
to its license as a precondition to downloading and using itsbottom) ‘‘Terms and Conditions’’ which proscribe, among
software is fatal to its argument that a contract has beenother things, copying for commercial use. However, the cus-
formed . . .tomer need not view the Terms and Conditions to proceed
The case law on software licensing has not eroded thestraight to the event page which interests him. 28
importance of assent in contract formation. Mutual assent isThe judge in Ticketmaster distinguished the lack of the bedrock of any agreement to which the law will give
conspicuousness of the notice and the lack of a require- force. Defendants’ position, if accepted, would so expand the
definition of assent as to render it meaningless. Because thement of consent in this case from shrinkwrap cases,
user Plaintiffs did not assent to the license agreement, theynoting:
are not subject to the arbitration clause contained therein
In defending this claim, Ticketmaster makes reference to and cannot be compelled to arbitrate their claims against
the ‘‘shrinkwrap license’’ cases, where the packing on the the Defendants. 32
outside of the CD stated that opening the package consti-
tutes adherence to the license agreement (restricting repub-
lication) contained therein. This has been held to be Register.com v. Verio, Inc. enforceable. That is not the same as this case because the
‘‘shrink-wrap license agreement’’ is open and obvious and in In 2004, in Register.com, Inc. v. Verio, Inc., 33 the
fact hard to miss. Many websites make you click on ‘‘agree’’ United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
to the Terms and Conditions before going on, but Tick- confirmed the District Court ruling in the sameetmaster does not. Further, the Terms and Conditions are
matter, 34 providing further insight into the Americanset forth so that the customer needs to scroll down the
home page to find and read them. Many customers instead common-law position on online contract formation.
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A registrar of Internet domain names, Register.com, Significantly, however, the decision in Register.com
operated an independent and interactive online challenged the decision of the Central District of Cali-
database, called the ‘‘WHOIS’’ database containing the fornia Court in Ticketmaster to the effect that one must
names and personal contact information of the plaintiff’s actively click a separate ‘‘I agree’’ button in order to be
customers. Through the use of an automated software bound by the terms of the agreement.
program, or ‘‘robot’’, the defendant harvested informa- The Court of Appeal held as follows:
tion from this database, using the information to adver-
We recognize that contract offers on the Internet oftentise its own competing services to users who had recently require the offeree to click on an ‘‘I agree’’ icon. And no
registered Internet domain names with Register.com. doubt, in many circumstances, such a statement of agree-
ment by the offeree is essential to the formation of theCertain terms and conditions governing the use of contract. But not in all circumstances. While new commerce
Register.com’s WHOIS database at the time of the on the Internet has exposed courts to many new situations,
it has not fundamentally changed the principles of contract.impugned activities by Verio were printed on each
It is standard contract doctrine that when a benefit is offeredsearch result of the WHOIS database. They read as fol-
subject to stated conditions, and the offeree makes a deci-lows: sion to take a benefit with knowledge of the terms of the
offer, the taking constitutes an acceptance of the terms,By submitting a WHOIS query, you agree that you will use
which accordingly becomes binding on the offeree.this data only for lawful purposes and that, under no cir-
cumstances will you use this data to: (1) allow, In short, the Court held that even in the absence ofenable, or otherwise support the transmission of
a ‘‘click’’, an online contract may be held to be enforce-mass unsolicited, commercial advertising or solicita-
able if there is sufficient evidence that the Web site usertions via direct mail, electronic mail, or by tele-
phone; or (2) enable high volume, automated, electronic was made aware of terms governing the use of the Web
processes that apply to Register.com (or its systems). The site and the user continued to use the Web site there-
compilation, repackaging, dissemination or other use of this after.data is expressly prohibited without the prior written con-
sent of Register.com. Register.com reserves the right to Although these cases are American, the reasoning in
modify these terms at any time. By submitting this these cases would likely be applied in Canada (particu-
query, you agree to abide by these terms. [Emphasis larly in the common-law provinces). As illustrated in theadded]
cases, the issues likely to be dispositive in upholding the
It must be emphasized, however, that these terms validity of an online contract are whether the Web site
and conditions were only displayed to the user following user has knowledge of the conditions and has given
the submission of the WHOIS query. express or implied consent to them.
At trial, the District Court held, among other things,
that Verio had assented to the above terms of use, even
though it was not required to click an ‘‘I Agree’’ icon. On Conclusions and Recommendationsappeal the Court of Appeal agreed.
n the Paysystems decision, the Court held that Paysys-The decision of the Court of Appeal is based on I tems’s approach to online contract formation wasthree key factors: (i) the terms of use were published in
unenforceable. Ultimately, this conclusion is defensiblefull on the search results (rather than being made avail-
under Quebec law insofar as Paysystem’s approach toable via hyperlink); (ii) Verio engaged in persistent data
contract formation did not provide a means of deter-mining, returning to the Web site repeatedly to collect
mining whether or not the other party was actuallymore information (hence, while Verio may have success-
aware of the amended contractual terms posted onfully argued after a single visit that it was unaware of
Paysystems’s Web site or an unequivocal means of deter-and/or had not assented to the terms of use, Verio could
mining whether those terms had been accepted. How-not continue to argue this point following multiple
ever, in the Paysystems decision, the Court appears toaccess); and (iii) Verio actually admitted that it was aware
assert further that (i) tacit acceptance of an electronicof the terms of use. In effect, the fact that Verio came to
offer may never be binding; (ii) something more than aknow of the terms and conditions during its frequent
‘‘mere’’ click is likely required to form a binding onlinevisits to the site (and hence, knowingly acted in violation
contract; and (iii) a signature may be necessary to estab-of contractual terms that governed the use of the Web
lish binding consent to the online contract. It is sub-site) resulted in a contract breach. The Court reasoned
mitted that none of these latter assertions is accurate.that the situation of the defendant in this case was not
analogous to the one-time users in Specht who were Case law on point from the United States and appli-
oblivious to the presence of terms posted at the bottom cable case law from Canada (including Quebec) suggests
of a Web page. Indeed, Verio admitted that its daily that whether terms and conditions will be binding will
access to the WHOIS database supplied them with full depend on the method used to obtain the consent of
awareness of the terms according to which Register.com Web site users. Applying the principles that have been
offered a right of entry. The reasoning in Specht was thus applied in shrinkwrap license and webwrap cases, it
maintained, but distinguished on the facts. appears likely that Web site terms and conditions will be
✄
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116 Canadian Journal of Law and Technology
enforced where (i) the terms and conditions are conspic-
uous and likely to be read by, or knowledge of them
may be reasonably imputed to, visitors at the time of
their initial visit; and (ii) consent with the terms and
conditions may be reasonably implied.
On the basis of the above analysis, it is possible to 4. The ‘‘notice + click’’ approach. The user is
distinguish six different approaches to obtaining online presented an unambiguous notice to the effect that by
contract formation, as follows: performing a positive gesture (such as clicking an icon)
the user will be deemed to have accepted the terms of1. The ‘‘click plus’’ approach. The user is presented
the agreement that is made available by means of awith contractual terms and must scroll through, click an
hyperlinked text contained in the notice. The user must‘‘I agree’’ icon and do ‘‘something more’’ (such as typing
perform the positive gesture prior to accessing the onlinein a password, initials, OR clicking on a separate toggle
product or service. For example:button) prior to accessing the online product or service.
For example:
5. The ‘‘notice + passive hyperlink’’ approach. The
user is presented an unambiguous, conspicuous notice to
the effect that in subsequently using the Web site the
user will be deemed to have accepted the terms of an
agreement that is made available by means of hyper-
linked text contained in the notice. The user is not
required to click on the hyperlink nor perform any other
positive gesture prior to accessing the online product or
service. For example:
By using this Web site, you will be deemed to have accepted2. The ‘‘clickwrap’’ approach. The user is presented
the terms and conditions of the Legal Agreement [under-with the contractual terms and must scroll through and
lined text hyperlinked to agreement].click an ‘‘I agree’’ icon onscreen prior to accessing the
online product or service. For example:
6. The ‘‘webwrap’’ approach. The user is presented
with a hyperlink that leads the user to contractual terms
posted on the Web site. The user is not required to click
on the hyperlink nor perform any other positive gesture
prior to accessing the online product or service. The
following hyperlink is placed on the Web page (often at
the bottom of the page). For example:
Legal Agreement [underlined text hyperlinked to agree-
ment].
The risk that a court will hold that an approach to
3. The ‘‘notice + dual confirmation’’ approach. online contract formation is unenforceable will increase
The user is presented with an unambiguous notice to as one moves from the ‘‘click plus’’ approach to the
the effect that by performing a positive gesture (such as ‘‘webwrap’’ approach. 36 Based on the analysis above, the
clicking an icon) the user will be deemed to have first four approaches should form a binding contract in
accepted the terms of the agreement that is made avail- Canadian common and civil law (assuming no other
able by means of a hyperlinked text contained in the statutory formalities apply to the contract). The fifth
notice. The user must perform a dual confirmation ges- approach may create a binding contract in common-law
ture prior to accessing the online product or service jurisdictions, but likely will not create a binding contract
(such as clicking a toggle button, then clicking an ‘‘I under Quebec civil law. The pure webwrap approach
agree’’ icon). 35 For example: will almost never create a binding contract (unless there
is other circumstantial evidence that demonstrates
knowledge of and consent to the posted terms).
✄
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Notes:
1 J.Q. No. 1573 (C.Q. Civ.) [Paysystems], 500-22-101613-043 (C.Q.). intended to provide concrete guidance in relation to online offer and
acceptance.2 S.Q. 2001, c. 32.
8 The judgment is silent as to whether or not the Paysystems original3 Electronic Commerce Act, S.O. 2000, c. 17, s. 4. agreement stipulated that the contract could be amended by means of an
online posting of amended terms.4 Under Canadian common law, a binding contract requires the following
elements: (i) Offer — an expression of willingness to enter into a contract 9 In Paysystems, supra note 1 at para. 25 the judge writes:
on the stated terms; (ii) Unequivocal acceptance — acceptance of an offer
Il importe donc que la procédure utilisée par le vendeur de sitemust be ‘‘unconditional’’ (i.e., on precisely the same terms as the original
Internet, ou l’hébergeur, soit telle que l’acceptation de l’acheteur,offer) and communicated to the offeror; (iii) Consideration — the require-
ou hébergé, puisse être clairement donnée, sans équivoque, nonment that each party to a contract must give something in return for the
par clause négative, ou prévoyant acquiescement tacite au casother’s obligation to them, e.g., money or an exchange of obligations
d’utilisation du site. [emphasis added](which must have some value even if not monetary) as part of the same
transaction. Consideration given later may not be sufficient because ‘‘past 10 Ibid. at para. 13, citing Mes. Vincent Gautrais et MacKay, « Les contrats
consideration’’ is not good consideration; (iv) Intention to create legal informatique », in Denys-Claude Lamontagne, dir., Droit specialisé des
relations — both parties must intend to be legally bound by the terms of contrats, vol. 3, Cowansville, Yvon Blais, 2001 à la p. 288-289.
the contract; and (v) Certainty of terms — the parties to the agreement 11 The judge writes:must agree upon precisely the same terms. Terms of a contract can be
Il semble donc nécessaire, tant à ces auteurs qu’à la Cour, d’exigereither express or implied. An express term has the advantage of certainty,
une preuve plus valable d’acceptation d’un contrat informatiquealthough a number of implied terms are now well-established. These basic
qu’un simple « clic », sans possibilité de vérifier la rencontre deselements of contract formation are supplemented on occasion by statutory
volontés qui forment un contrat, où il doit y avoir « accord deformalities, such as writing and signature requirements required in order
volonté » (art. 1378 CCQ), sur le même objet (art. 1412 CCQ).to ensure the enforceability of the contract as a whole. In the common-law
provinces, these common-law rules have been supplemented by statutory Ibid. at para. 14.
e-commerce provisions that specifically address online contract formation. 12 The judge writes:Specifically, all Canadian provinces and territories have enacted electronic
commerce legislation. With the exception of the Quebec Technology Act, La Cour accepte bien ce qui précède mais tel contrat demeure
provincial legislation has been largely based on the Uniform Electronic quand même soumis au Code civil en matière de Consentement,
Commerce Act (‘‘UECA’’), a model law. The binding provincial legislation objet et moyens de preuve. À titre d’exemple: en 1999, la Cour
is as follows: Alberta: Electronic Transactions Act, S.A. 2001, c. E-5.5 (the Supérieure d’Ontario acceptait un contrat conclu sur Internet
‘‘Alberta Act’’); British Columbia: Electronic Transactions Act, S.B.C. 2001, parce que le co-contractant devait « cliquer » sur une icône
c. 10 (the ‘‘B.C. Act’’); Manitoba: Electronic Commerce and Information marquée « I agree », signifiant ainsi directement son accord audit
Act, C.C.S.M. 2000, c. E55 (the ‘‘Manitoba Act’’); New Brunswick: Elec- contrat. (Rudder et al. v. Microsoft Corporation, 2. Canadian
tronic Transactions Act, S.N.B. 2001, c. E-5.5 (the ‘‘N.B. Act’’); Newfound- Patent Reporter, 4th, p. 274).
land and Labrador: Electronic Commerce Act, S.N.L. 2001, c. E-5.2 (the Ibid. at paras. 23, 24.‘‘Newfoundland Act’’); Nova Scotia: Electronic Commerce Act, S.N.S.
13 Me Antoine Leduc, « Les contrat de création et le contrat d’hébergement2000, c. 26 (the ‘‘N.S. Act’’); Ontario: Electronic Commerce Act, S.O. 2000,
d’un site web: éléments de négociation, de rédaction et d’interprétation »c. 17 (the ‘‘Ontario Act’’); Prince Edward Island: Electronic Commerce Act,
in Développements recents en droit de l’Internet, Cowansville (QC),S.P.E.I. 2001, c. E 4.1 (the ‘‘P.E.I. Act’’); Quebec: Act to establish a legal
Yvon Blais, 2001, 143 à la p. 179 cited in Paysystems supra note 1 atframework for information technology, S.Q. 2001, c. 32 (the ‘‘Quebec
para. 3 writes:Technology Act’’); Saskatchewan: Electronic Information and Documents
Act, S.S. 2000, c. E-7.22 (the ‘‘Saskatchewan Act’’). The Ontario Act, which On estime que, sauf exception, les contrats informatiques ne
is typical of the UECA-based e-commerce legislation, confirms that an requièrent pas normalement le respect d’exigences autres que
agreement or contract may be formed electronically. Subsection 19(1) celles, habituellement demandées, de la signature, et ce, quelque
provides that an offer, the acceptance of an offer or any other matter that is (sic) soit le support (pages 287 à 888).
material to the formation or operation of a contract may be expressed: 14 The judge writes:(a) by means of electronic information or an electronic document; or
(b) by an act that is intended to result in electronic communication, such Il est admis que les amendements R-1 audit contrat l-1 n’ont pas
as touching or clicking on an appropriate icon or other place on a com- été signés par les parties, mais la requérante allègue qu’ils sont
puter screen. The remaining common-law provinces, other than New valables parce que l’intimée a continué à utiliser le site après la
Brunswick (see below), generally echo the requirements in the UECA and date du 23 octobre 2003. Il y aurait donc consentement tacite du
the Ontario Act for electronic contract formation. They provide that fait de cette utilisation postérieure à l’avis contenue en R-2, et cité
unless the parties agree otherwise, an agreement may be formed (i) by plus avant. Ce geste équivaudrait à signature.
means of an electronic document; or (ii) by an act, such as touching a Ibid. at para. 12.computer screen or clicking on an icon, that is intended to electronically
15 A.J. No. 512 (Q.B.).communicate assent. The N.B. Act does not contain the above provision.
Nevertheless, the New Brunswick government released a Discussion Paper 16 J.Q. No. 3606 (C.S.).
in December 2000, wherein the Legislative Services Branch of the Depart- 17 See online: Multiple Listing Service Canada, <http://www.mls.ca>.ment of Justice indicated that it doubted the section says ‘‘anything tha t is
Despite the preliminary finding in Sutton, the MLS Web site has subse-not the law already’’.
quently adopted a clickwrap approach to online consent (instead of a5 Consumer Protection Act, R.S.Q. P-40.1, s. 23. mere webwrap approach).
6 In common-law provinces, writing, signature, and other formal require- 18 J.Q. No. 1105 (C.S.).
ments are typically set forth in Statute of Frauds, based or other statutory 19 S.C.R. 120 at. 131.consumer protection legislation, such as Consumer Protection Act,
20 (1921) 62 S.C.R. 166 at 169.R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 69 (British Columbia), Fair Trading Act, R.S.A. 2000, c. F-2
(Alberta), Consumer Protection Act, S.S. 1996, c. C-30.1 (Saskatchewan), 21 2001 11JCan 14469 (QC C.Q.).
Consumer Protection Act, C.C.S.M. c. C200 (Manitoba), Consumer Protec- 22 O.J. No. 665, 22 (Sup. Ct.).tion Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C-31 (Ontario), Consumer Protection Act, S.O.
2002, c. C-30, Sched. A (Ontario), Consumer Product Warranty and Lia- 23 Ibid. at para. 23 [emphasis added].
bility Act, S.N.B. 1978, c. C-18.1 (New Brunswick), Consumer Protection 24 It is of relevance to note that section 42 of the Regulations to the OntarioAct, R.S.N.S. 1989, c. 92 (Nova Scotia), Consumer Protection Act, R.S.P.E.I. Consumer Protection Act, 2002, O. Reg. 17/05, which came into force,1988, Cap. C-19 (P.E.I.), Consumer Protection Act, R.S.N.L. 1990, c. C-31 subsequent to the Kanitz decision, on July 30, 2005, effectively allows a(Newfoundland and Labrador). supplier to amend, renew, and extend an Internet agreement unilaterally
7 This case comment is not intended to provide exhaustive treatment of provided that (a) the agreement authorizes the supplier to do so, (b) the
issues related to the enforceability of online contracts. Rather, it is agreement allows the consumer to either terminate or retain the existing
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118 Canadian Journal of Law and Technology
agreement, and that (c) advance prior notice is given to the consumer. 30 150 F. Supp. 2d 585 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) [Specht].
Such notice must be given between the 30th and 90th day before the 31 The wording of the notice stated the following: ‘‘Please review and agree
date the amendment, renewal, or extension is proposed to take effect, to the terms of the Netscape SmartDownload Software License Agree-
must be provided in a manner that is likely to come to the consumer’s ment before downloading and using the software’’.
attention, and must explain the consequence for the consumer of not 32 Specht, supra note 30 at 28.responding to the notice.
33 356 F. 3d 393 (2d Cir. N.Y. 2004), 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 1074.25 Supra, note 15.
34 126 F. Supp. 2d 238, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18846 (S.D.N.Y., 2000).26 See, e.g., Step-Saver Data Systems, Inc. v. Wyse Technology, 939 F.2d 91
35 The toggle must not be pre-selected by default if this is to be considered(1989), Arizona Retail Systems Inc. v. Software Link, 831 F.Supp. 759 (D.
an effective dual confirmation mechanism.Ariz. 1993), ProCD Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447 (1996), Hill v.
Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 1147 (N.D. Ill. 1996), M.A. Mortenson 36 Note: for any one of these approaches, the likelihood of a finding of
Company Inc. v. Timberline Software Corporation, 970 P.2d 803 (2000). enforceability should be further increased or decreased depending on the
relative clarity of the terms used in the consent notice, the size of font, the27 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4553, 2 Fed. Appx. 741 (C.D. Cal. 2000).
relative conspicuousness of the placement of the notice on the screen28 Ibid., at 2. (above or below the fold), the ability of the user to access the online
29 Ibid., at 8. products or services directly by bypassing the above notices, etc.
✄
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